University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Edward H. Levi Speeches

Faculty Scholarship

7-28-1976

Address by the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of the
United States before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. 8:00
PM, PST. Wednesday, July 28, 1976. Empire Ballroom, Ridpath
Hotel & Motor Inn. Spokane, Washington.
Edward H. Levi
EdwardHirsch.Levi@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech

Recommended Citation
Levi, Edward H., "Address by the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of the United States before
the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. 8:00 PM, PST. Wednesday, July 28, 1976. Empire Ballroom, Ridpath
Hotel & Motor Inn. Spokane, Washington." (1976). Edward H. Levi Speeches. 41.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech/41

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Edward H. Levi Speeches by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

!J!iJartm!ut ll~ ~ nsti!!
ADVANCE FOR RELEASE, 8 P.M. PST
WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 1976

ADDRESS
BY
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During the last year and a half, for various reasons, I
have often recalled a statement made by Lord Devlin in his book
which came out some years ago on "The Criminal Prosecut.ion in
England."

In defending some lack of judicial control 'over pre

trial criminal investigations in England. Lord Devlin wrote: "What
is beyond argument is that whatever the powers of the investigator
may be the ideal is that he should exercise them judicially."
"It does not necessarily follow." he went on to say, "that the
job should be handed over to the judiciary.

For while it is

desirable that the investigator should act judicially, it is
essential for the safety of the realm and of its citizens that
he should have at his disposal all the powers and resources of the
executive arm."

Then he added the axiom: "It would not be good

for judges to act executivelYi it is better to expect executives
to act judicially."

And as to this he said, "It is not at all an

impracticable ideal."
As a way of discussing a small segment of the Department of
Justice's work, I would like to discuss three clusters of problems
which in different ways concern the administration of justice, and
where the Department in the implementation of executive authority
is attempting "to act judicially."

The ideal is not impracticable.

Of course, there are tensions.
The first cluster:

The 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes

held that newsmen bad no absolute right under the First Amendment

to refuse to testify before federal or state grand juries with
respect to information given them in confidence or with respect
to

their confidential sources of information.

The decision

was by a 5-4 vote with Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshall dissenting.
In his majority opinion, Justice White began by distinguishing
those situations where the confidential sources of the newsmen
were themselves implicated in the crime

fr~

those instances where

the source not so involved would refuse to talk to newsmen if the
source feared his identity would be later revealed.
made

s~ch

But having

a distinction, Justice White refused to recognize

a privilege in either case.

To recognize such a privilege, he

pointed out, would involve the Court in defining categories of
newsmen or writers, lecturers, academic researchers or dramatists
who could be said to be eligible.

If the privilege were to be a

qualified one, as had been urged, this would in turn enmesh the
Court in

c~plicated

considerations of what constituted a compelling

governmental interest suggesting a differential treatment among
various criminal laws.

He pointed out that newsmen were not help

less; they had powerful means of influencing, public opinion to
protect themselves

fr~

haraBsment'> or substantial harm..

For

this and perhaps other reasons, prosecutors might be expected to
act with discretion.

Indeed the Attorney General had already

fashioned a set of rules for federal officials in connection with
subpoenaing members of the press.

These rules were a major step

and they might be sufficient to resolve the disagreements and

controversies.
The tone of Justice Powell's concurring opinion was somewhat
different.

He emphasized the continuing role of the courts to

quash a subpoena or to issue a protective order so that the
asserted claim to privilege could be judged on its facts by
striking a proper balance--the tried and traditional way of
adjudicating such questions.

So too the dissent recognized

that if the privilege were conferred, the courts would have to
make some delicate judgments, but that "after all," the dissenters
said, His the function of courts of law."
Against this background the Department of Justice has operated
on the basis of revised guidelines issued in 1973., The guidelines
provide that no such subpoena may be issued without the approval
of the Attorney General and state that if a subpoena is obtained
without authorization, the Department will move to quash it.
During

my

tenure we have construed the term "news media" broadly.

For example, in a case in this circuit in which a group of docu
mentary filmmakers were subpoenaed with respect to a film they
were making about various fugitives, we had the subpoena, which
had been obtained without approval, quaShed.
The guidelines provide standards which call upon the Depart
ment itself to strike the balance Justice Powell's opinion in
Branzburg discussed.

They require that

b~fore

the issuance of

a subpoena to any newsman is authorized, all reasonable efforts

to secure the information in question from non-media sources
must first be exhausted and negotiations with the person to be
subpoenaed must be undertaken with a view toward securing
voluntary compliance.

If negotiations fail, subpoenas are

issued to newsmen unwilling to appear only when the information
sought is essential to the successful conduct of a criminal inves
tigation, and every effort is made to limit the scope of the
subpoena to that information which is necessary to verify the
accuracy of published reports.

The guidelines finally provide

that "(e)ven subpoena authorization requests for publicly dis
closed information should be treated with care to avoid claims
of harassment."
In the six years since the o'riginal guidelines were announced,
an average of fewer than 20 subpoenas per year have been issued
to newsmen at the request of the Department of Justice.

The

majority of these subpoenas simply called for the production
and authentication of photographs, films, tape recordings or other
evidence of guilt or innocence in the possession of a news organization.

In most cases, agreements with the newsmen were reached;

the subpoenas were issued at the request

o~

the newsmen as a matter

of personal convenience or professional practice.

,

Difficult fact situations do arise and when they do, we have
given considerable weight to whether the information to be elicited
by the subpoena was given to the newsman in confidence and whether
. the newsman would be asked to reveal confidential sources.

Though

these factors do not appear explicitly in the guidelines, they

are, as the Branzburg case makes clear, properly the center of
the press' First Amendment concerns.
Last year I was asked to issue a subpoena of a newsman who
had written a series of articles purporting to expose misconduct
on the part of government officials.

There was some suspicion

that a "source" quoted in the article was either mythical or
was dissembling with the reporter .. Despite these suspicions, I
decided not to authorize the subpoena.

Ny decision was reached

in part because of the issue of confidentiality of sources.

But

I was concerned also that there would have been the appearance;l
of harassment.

The articles in question had gained considerable

attention and had purported to uncover government wrongdoing.
I should add that later, the reporter agreed to testify voluntarily.
I was'about to say that my view is that our practice is working
fairly well in this area, which is so close to constitutionally
protected rights, and then to go on to admit I had not had to
face the case where the compelling circumstance was that without
the testimony a prosecution would not be possible.

One reason

the hard compelling circumstance issue has not had to be confronted
is because the practical inhibitions which' prosecutors feel have
simply kept some cases from progressing to that point.
The second cluster:

Another area close to the reach of policy

of constitutional protection is the
by federal and state prosecutors.

quest~on

of dual prosecutions

In 1959 in Abbate v. United States, the Supreme Court re
affirmed its holding of more than three decades earlier in
United States v. Lanza that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar federal prosecution of a defendant previously
tried in state court for the same act or acts.

In the Abbate

case, the previous state court trial for conspiracy to destroy
the property of telephone companies had resulted in a sentence of
three months imprisonment.

The Court reasoned that the federal

and state governments are separate sovereigns; each can punish,
independently of the other, offenses against its laws.

Justice

Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, dis-.
sented.

Justice Black observed that the possibilities of un

fairness to defendants, which the double jeopardy bar is intended
to prevent, are implicated quite as much by seriatim-prosecutions
by different sovereigns as they are ,by such prosecutions by the
same sovereign.

"Most free countries," he wrote. uhave acc.epted

a prior conviction elsewhere as a bar to a second trial in their
jurisdiction."
just as dangerous to human freedom for a man to be punished twice
for the same offense, once by a State and once by the United States,
as it would be for one of these two governments to throw him in
prison twice for the same offense."
Shortly
issued a

aft~r

the Abbate decision, Attorney General Rogers

menoran~to

United States Attorneys concerning the

i:~

exercise of the dual prosecution power which Abbate had reaffirmed.
The memorandum perhaps was the product in part of an apprehension,
based on the forcefulness of Justice Black's dissent and warn
ings against abuses voiced in the majority opinion in Abbate
and its companion case,

Bartku~

v. Illinois, (which involved a

prior acquittal), that unless the power was exercised wisely and
with restraint, the Court's decision might prove unstable.

Un

doubtedlyalso influential was Justice Brennan's dissentiag opinion
in Bartkus, which charged the federal officers with having
engineered the second-- this time a state --prosecution.
!n the memorandum Attorney General Rogers announced the Justice
Department's policy that "there should be no federal trial for the
same act or acts unless the reasons are compelling."

At the same

time, however, Attorney General Rogers doubted it was "wise or
pradtical to attempt to formulate detailed rules to deal" with
the wide variety of situations that

migh~

arise.

Instead, to

ensure that the general policy was enforced, and enforced even
handedly, he required that no federal case should be tried when
there has already been a state prosecution for the same act or
acts without approval· by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General
with review by the Attorney General.
The requirement announced by Attorney General Rogers remains
in effect.

Along the way, however, "compelling reasons" was

changed in the U.S. Attorneys' manual to read "compelling federal
interests involved," which conceivably narrowed the focus.

"The

application of the standard. at least in my tenure. has proved.
both as to substance and procedure. to be difficult and puzzling.
So far as one can tell. the Department does not have much of a
memory on the cases which have gone through the process.
Very few of these dual prosecution problems come to the
Attorney General's attention each year. in some years fewer than
twenty--a very modest number compared to the volume of federal
prosecutions.

But they are important both as an effort to

achieve fairness and also because of the necessity of adequately
vindicating the federal interest.

Let me describe a few of the recent cases,

In one

case the complaining witness in a Mann Act prosecution was
found murdered shortly before the federal defendant was to
go to trial.

The federal defendant was indicted for murder

in the state court.

On the same evidence, the defendant

could have been tried in. federal court for obstruction of
justice.

The federal prosecutor deferred to the State,

because of the greater penalties that would attach to a murder

.

conviction.

The defendant was then tried in state court and

acquitted.

There was no indication that the state prosecutors

had been disabled from presenting all available evidence of
defendant's guilt, or that. the trial was anything but fair.
There seemed to be no factual differenc'e which would be
relevant to the prosecution for obstruction of justice.

There

is of course a great federal interest in ensuring that a
defendant guilty of obstruction of federal justice be punished,
and moreover the federal interest is distinct from that of
the State.
In another case a defendant was convicted in state court
for embezzlement of funds, a portion of which he had transported
in interstate commerce.

The state court imposed what federal

prosecutors regarded as an absurdly light sentence -- a brief
period of probation.

Again, there was no indication of

corruption or any unfairness in the state court proceeding.

In a third case, a man stopped by state police for a minor
traffic offense was discovered in possession of a sawed-off
shotgun -- a federal crime carrying a possible ten-year
penalty.

He was taken by police to municipal court and

arraigned.

On advice of counsel, he entered a guilty plea to

a state offense and received the maximum sentence:
Counsel in that case was quite astute.

one month.

Counsel in other cases

have shown a similar awareness of the DepartmentLs policy
against dual prosecution to their client's great advantage.
There apparently was an agreement between the federal and state
authorities.

State authorities had agreed to defer to federal

prosecution, but had failed to inform the law enforcement officers
involved.
As one struggles with these and other cases, one reaches
for what meaning to give "compelling reasons" or "compelling
federal interests."

Overall one has to have a direction.

Is

it to be assumed that dual prosecutions are always suspect ,as
unfair in the absence of compelling circumstances because
inherently, if not technically, they involve double jeopardy?
This could be taken as the warning of the dissent in Abbate.
But there might be a different standard which would find unfairness
presumptively only when there is reason to suspect that prosecutors
who lost or were dissatisfied with their first attempt have in
fact taken part in and brought about the second prosecution.
Against these general alternative standards, one may then seek
additio.nal touchstones.

An acquittal in the first case emphasizes

the double jeopardy point.

On the other hand if the result of

the state prosecution, no matter what its outcome, could not reach
the federally mandated penalty, this suggests the possibility
of an overriding reason or federal interest.

Even absent such

disparate maximum sentences, it is possible that the same
circumstances may speak to a different federal concern.

Overall

there is the problem of how to go about getting effective
reinforcement for an agreed upon division of labor between
United States Attorneys and State ,and local prosecutors

each

agreeing to defer prosecutorial responsibilities to the other
where the law under which the other operates carries the greater
sanction.

Attorney General Rogers' 1959 memorandum stated:

"Cooperation between federal and state prosecutive officers
is essential if the gears of the federal and state systems are to
mesh properly.

We should continue to make every effort to

cooperate with state and local authorities to the end that the
trial occur in the jurisdiction, whether it be state or 'federal,
where the public interest is best served.

If this be determined

accurately, and is followed by efficient and intelligent
cooperation of state and federal law enforcement authorities,
then consideration of a second prosecution very seldom should
arise."
In some jurisdictions, there are formal and informal
cooperative arrangements to this effect; and in most jurisdictions,
perhaps, !£ hoc adjustments are made.

The precise content of

such arrangements and adjustments necessax:ily must vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on the content of state
law. The great virtue of such arrangements is that they deal
with both sides of the problems -- that is, state following

federal prosecution, as well as federal following state -- while
the Department "s policy, unilaterally enforced, can deal only
with the latter.

But such arrangements and adjustments have

an inevitable instability over time, with changes in personnel.
in prosecutoria1 emphasis -- indeed, with changes in law.

In

addition, there is occasional laxity in application and the
slip-ups common to law enforcement as to any human institution.
The Department of Justice is now engaged in an effort -
an effort long past due .. - to bring some stability and coherence
to the decisions as to dual prosecutions.
effort, through revision

~nd

One part of the

clear statement in the United States

Attorneys'Manua1, is simply to ensure that the United States
Attorneys are clearly aware of Department policy and will act
accordingly.

In several cases, the Solicitor General has moved

the Supreme Court for an order to vacate a court of appeals
judgment affirming conviction and to remand to allow a motion
to dismiss, where the United States Attorney has failed to
obtain permis,sion for dual prosecution and where permission
would not have been granted had it been sought.
In one such case in 1975, Watts v. United States, Chief
Justice Burger along with Justice White and Justice Rehnquist
dissented from the Court's acceptance of the Solicitor General's
recommendation.

"[A] ssuming as I do, n wrote Chief Justice

Burger, Uthat Abbate and Bartkus remain good'law, there is no
reason for the Court to lend its aid to the implementation of
an internal prosecutoria1 policy applicable only by speculation
on our part, and there are abundant reasons for not doing so."

This dissenting assertion of judicial independence, with which
I have no doubt many of you have much sympathy, perhaps raises
questions as to what kinds of problems can be handled either
by the guidelines approach or the cases by case elaboration of
prosecutorial discretion.

The Solicitor General's motion to vacate

seems to us to be an indispensable tool if a consistent policy
within the Department and among the United States Attorneys
is to be maintained.

The third cluster: Since at least 1940, the Department of
Justice has had special responsibilities for the conduct of
warrantless electronic surveillance.

In 1965 there were 233

telephone wiretaps under this program and 67

microphone~;

1975 there were 122 telephones and 24 microphones.
Devlin in his book records that for England,

~here

in

Lord
such

interceptions are authorized by the Home Secretary, for the year
1956 the total number of interceptions for police, customs and
security amounted to 159.
As you know, Title III. of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968

e~tab1ished

detailed procedures regarding

the interception of wire and oral communications.

It requires

the issuance of a warrant by a judge. upon a probable cause
finding of the commission of a crime, with notice to the subject
of the surveillance after a certain period unless this is waived
by the judge.

It is not exactly the procedure one would use

for the continuing detection of the foreign intelligence acti
vities of foreign powers and their agents.

Title III contains

a savings clause which states that the Act does not limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against the actual
or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power,
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States, or, to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities.

In the Keith Case in 1972 the Supreme Court said of this
savings clause "Congress simply left Presidential powers 'where
it found them."
In Keith, the Supreme Court held that in the field of
internal security, where there is no significant foreign
involvement, electronic surveillance may not be undertaken
in the absence of a judicial warrant.

Justice Powell emphasized

that "this case involves only the domestic aspects of national
security.

We have expressed no opinion as to the issues which

may be involved with respect to the activities of foreign powers
or their'agents."

Since Keith, the Third Circuit and the Fifth

Circuit have each held that the Fourth Amendment does not require
a warrant for electronic surveillance instituted to obtain
foreign intelligence.

The District of Columbia Cir,cuit f s

holding in Zweibon v. Mitchell is consistent with these'results,
although Judge Wright's opinion for four of the nine judges
contains much dicta suggesting that some kind of judicial
warrant must be obtained for any nonconsensual electronic
surveillance.
Under the standards 'and procedures established by the'
President, the personal approval of the Attorney General is
required before any non-consensual electronic surveillance may
be instituted within the United States without a judicial
warrant.

All requests for

su~veillance

mUst be made in writing

by the Director of the FBI and must set forth the relevant
justifying circumstances.

Both the agency and the Presidential

appointee initiating the request must be identified.

The

requests come to the attention of the Attorney General only
after they have been extensively reviewed by the FBI, by a
designated Department official ,and by a special review group
established within the Office of the Attorney General.

Each

request, before authorization or denial, receives my personal
attention.

Under no circumstances are warrantless wiretaps

or electronic surveillance directed against any individual
who is not a conscious agent or collaborator of a foreign
power.

A year ago I publicly stated that there were no out

standing instances of'warrantless taps or electronic surveillance
directed against American citizens.

There are no such instances

now.
Although there is a strong and essential legal basis for
continuing warrantless telephone and·microphone surveillance
for foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence
purposes, the President has proposed legislation providing a
procedure for the issuance of warrants in these cases.

The

proposal follows the implied suggestions of Justice Lewis
Powell in the Almeida-Sanchez and Keith cases that special
warrant procedures can be fashioned to meet unique circumstances.
We have not asked the judges to act executively.
could be issued by anyone of seven

feder~l

The warrant

district judges,

designated by the Chief Justice, only if,. on the basis of the
submitted facts, there is probable cause to believe that the
target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of

a foreign power and the facilities or place at which the
electronic surveillance is directed are being used, or about
to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.

The President's initiative in this matter was to the

Congress and particularly to a bipartisan group of leaders
in both houses.

The bill has been reported out favorably with

a vote of eleven to one by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and it
is now before the new Intelligence Committee.
While this initiative by the President, when seen in the
context of the history of our country for the last thirty-six
years, is a major move for the protection of both individual
rights and for essential protection fdr the country, there
has been opposition to the proposed measure.

Part of that

opposition comes from those who, like Mr. Wicker of the' New
York Times, believe the proposed legislation is full of loopholes,
booby traps and prpvisions that extend rather than restrict
the Government" s surveillance powers.

Another part apparently,

if one is to believe Mr. Evans and Mr. Novak, comes from those
who believe the bill, on the contrary, will cripple our intelli
gence effort.

It is said that in my adv.ocacy of the bill I

have been moved more by constitutional safeguards than demands
of national security.

That really is not a dichotomy I accept.

I am concerned that a step long overdue, fashioned to protect
constitutional rights and national interests, may be delayed
and perhaps never put into place.
In the meantime I trust the Department will continue to
try to act judicially, for this is an area of extreme importance.

